“There is a feud between two clans within Fidesz, between the politicians and the businessmen, for money, power, and influence.”

“The Orbán system is damaging to Hungary. Our Democracy is not liberal, freedom of the press is limited, and the division of power is inadequate—but we live in neither a dictatorship nor a fascist state.” – Péter Esterházy

Translation of “Péter Esterházy: Orbán is not a statesman” appearing in Hungarian liberal weekly 168 óra.

“The Orbán system is damaging to Hungary.  Our Democracy is not liberal, freedom of the press is limited, and the division of power is inadequate—but we live in neither a dictatorship nor a fascist state” said Péter Esterházy to German weekly Der Freitag.

The left-liberal oriented weekly publication is edited by Jacob Augstein, the son of the founder of Der Spiegel.  The writer, who is well known in Germany, offered the following answers to questions relating to the situation in Hungary:

“The Viktor Orbán of the 1980s was a likable, young rebel who inspired hope.  The turn happened at the end of 1993 and started with the death of József Antall.  He recognized that a modern, right-wing party was missing from the Hungarian political map.  This would not have been a problem if he had brought about a conservative or liberal party based on Western examples, but instead he built a populist movement.   The Hungarians like to wallow in self-pity, and Orbán strengthens this in them.  He cleverly manipulates Hungarian’s sence of uncertainty, just as many predecessors have over the centuries, and adopts a youthful, rebel pose. Instead of acting responsibly, he builds and spreads fear based on the Hungarians emotions.   Orbán is not a statesman.”

“The Hungarians snarl at Brussels in the morning, but then in the afternoon check to see whether the European Union payments arrived to their accounts.   Naturally, we belong to Europe. However, after decades of repression it is difficult for such a small country to immediately give up its independence.  This is a question of education.    Instead of explaining to the country what the government is using the EU money for, Orbán launches attacks on Brussels.   At the same time, certain questions are perfectly valid: is it the responsibility of the European Union or individual states to determine the immigration quota?  And are the interests of Germany and Hungary really the same?   Orbán makes no secret of his admiration of the effectiveness of authoritarian regimes—he is playing from the same manuscript as the Turkish president Erdoğan, who himself is not a flawless democrat.  I cannot know whether Orbán is serious about Putin—I suspect he wants to demonstrate to everyone that Hungary acts independently”.

“However pretty the Orbán-Simicska war episode, it does not mean that the case of Hungarian democracy stands better.  There is a feud between two clans within Fidesz, between the politicians and the businessmen, for money, power, and influence.”

“There is no direct pressure on creators, but the government inspects where the money went, and the pressure follows from this: which theatre, which publishers receive support, which game show and television film is made. In this way the Orbán system strongly intervenes in culture, and this is very dangerous.  . . .

I can write, publish what I want, but that is not important.  The real question is whether a journalist in the countryside can write what he wants.   I think not.  And there is the question of who we reach.  The outstanding liberal weekly publication “Life and Literature” is published in 20,000 copies.  This is already something, but it is not really a lot in a country of 10 million.  And who can appear on state owned television?  They haven’t invited me for years . . . “